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Inequalities between retirees and workers: 
an empirical model to capture the effect of taxation. 
Bérangère Legendre 
 
1. Introduction 
 
French pensioners benefit from tax deductions. In the context of pension system reform 
and given the impact of the current financial and economic crisis on government deficits, the 
tax preference given to senior citizens raises questions. Lavigne (2006) asks, “Should we give 
tax benefits to the elderly?” The author explains that the tax benefits given to retirees imply 
considerable public tax expenditures that are unjustifiable in terms of equity. Current retirees 
enjoy an average standard of living, nearly equivalent to that of persons in the labour force 
(See El Mekkaoui De Freitas et al., 2008, and Conseil d’Orientation des retraites, 2009). 
According to the French statistical institute (INSEE), the ratio of retired individuals’ income 
per consumption unit to that of workers was approximately 0.89 in 2003 (0.96 including 
capital income). Moreover, pensioners’ incomes are, on average, 102% of the average income 
of the population. Inter-cohort inequalities do not seem to justify these tax exemptions. 
Pensions are more equally distributed than income received from employment (See Brown 
and Prus, 2006), and intra-cohort inequality does not seem to be a more convincing 
explanation. 
 
The existence of an increased risk of poverty among pensioners is also a questionable 
justification for this preferential tax treatment. According to the INSEE, the poverty rate is 
greater among labour force participants than among retirees. With a poverty threshold set at 
60% of the median income, the poverty rate for pensioners amounted to 9.6% in 2006 
compared to 9.8% for those in the labour force. With a threshold set at 50% of the median 
income, the INSEE estimates the poverty rate for men aged 60-74 to be 3.6% compared to 
6.4% for 50- to 59-year-old men. However, according to Eurostat, the poverty rate for people 
over 60 years of age was 6.9% in 2007 but only 6.5% among those under the age of 60. 
Eurostat’s results show an increasing poverty trend among retirees since 2009: 7.4% among 
people aged 60 and over compared to 4.8% for those under 60. 
 
Several phenomena with opposing effects influence the living standards of pensioners.  
Young people and future retirees have or will have experienced more setbacks than middle 
aged people during their careers (See Cloarec, 2000, Colin, Iehlé and Mahieu, 2000, and 
Briard et al., 2009). It is therefore more difficult for individuals of these generations to meet 
all of the requirements for a full pension beginning at retirement age. Moreover, several 
reforms have contributed to increasing the contributory demands of the French pension 
system: 
- Increased career duration, 
- A higher legal retirement age, 
- The establishment of a discounting mechanism. 
 
These phenomena have resulted in an increased risk of poverty for future generations of 
retirees (See Franco et al., 2009). However, this risk is offset by the increased participation of 
women from younger generations in the labour market and by an increase in the average skill 
level.  
In this preliminary research, we examine the adequacy of tax arrangements for French 
retirees. What is the impact of differential taxation on the inequality between retirees and 
workers? 
 
  
 
 
2. Taxation in France 
 
French pensioners benefit from specific tax rules concerning income taxation, social 
contributions, housing and property taxes. These are the most important examples: 
 
- Elderly people benefit from a 10% reduction in taxes if they are retired. The age of a 
taxpayer may also prompt special discounts. For example, for retirees over the age of 
65, an allowance of 1,138 euros is provided if the overall net income is between 
14,010 and 22,590 euros. This allowance may be up to 2,276 euros if the total net 
income is less than or equal to 14,010 euros. This policy has no age limit for disabled 
individuals. 
- The taxation of a life annuity depends on the age when its holder first received the 
entitlement. If the holder was under 50 at enrolment, 70% of the amount of the annuity 
is taxable. If the beneficiary waits until age 60, the taxable portion drops to 40%. 
- An exemption from the property tax on buildings is planned for retirees older than 75 
years. This exemption is subject to the individual’s income. Retirees aged 65 to 75 
years are also eligible for a rebate of 100 euros. 
- Residents living in a nursing home do not pay the housing tax. People over the age of 
60 can be exempted from housing tax, subject to the income of the individual. If 
retirees over 60 live with one or more adult children seeking employment, they receive 
automatic relief from paying the housing tax. 
- Concerning social contributions, retirees may receive exemptions depending on their 
income level. When they are subject to taxation, they often benefit from lower tax 
rates.   
 
According to Ferrand and Lenseigne (2010), some of these tax dispositions are no longer 
relevant in France. Recent studies show that retired and active households have equivalent 
standards of living (See COR, 2009, and Legendre, 2010). Other tax rules remain useful when 
they respond to a precise social need. For instance, expenses related to a person’s disability 
are eligible for specific tax cuts.   
 
 
3. Survey and empirical model 
 
We use data from the European survey EU-SILC (Community Statistics on Income 
and Living Conditions) for 2004 to 2007. Specifically, we use the French data from the SRCV 
(Statistics on Resources and Living Conditions) included in the European survey and 
conducted by the National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE). 
The French SILC (Community Statistics on Income and Living Conditions) survey addresses 
issues relating to poverty and the living conditions of individuals and households. It provides 
information on the taxes and social security costs incurred by households as well as social 
benefits.  
 
We create two representative and exhaustive samples of the population: 
- The retired sample includes individuals declaring that they are retired, 
 
- The sample of workers includes the active population of employed and unemployed 
people seeking a job. 
 
Retaining only those individuals from either exclusively active households or exclusively 
retired households, we propose an indicator for the inequality between the active population 
and retirees: 
  
              
 
where acttcy ,  is the average equivalent income of the active population ranged by percentile, c, 
and  rettcy ,  is the equivalent income of retirees ranged by percentiles (see figure 1).  
 
The figure 1 depicts the equivalent income over the distribution among retirees and workers. 
We note that individuals belonging to the lowest percentiles of workers receive a higher 
equivalent income than individuals belonging to the highest percentiles of retirees. But from 
the 76th to the 84th percentile, retirees receive a higher equivalent income than workers.  
 
In the following procedure, we explain the difference between acttcy ,  and
ret
tcy , , depicted in the 
figure 1. This difference is taken as a proxy for inequality between workers and retirees, and 
is represented by the indicator tcy , . 
 
This indicator tcy ,  allows us to compare the retired population and the active population 
despite the different sizes of the samples.   
 
Figure 1 Income distribution: equivalent incomes by percentile, 2007 
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Within the households, we assign each member an equivalent disposable income. The 
OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development) equivalence scale is used 
in which one unit of consumption is attributed to the first household adult member, 0.5 to 
other members over the age of 14, and 0.3 to children under 14.  
(1) [ ]100,1,,,, ∈∀−= cyyy rettcacttctc  
 
 We first propose an OLS specification using data for the years 2004 to 2007.   
cy  indicates the inequality between retirees and workers and is the dependant variable in the 
following specification: 
 
     
 
 
where cX  includes the explanatory variables. As explained above, French retirees benefit 
from specific tax rules. Consequently, we introduce the following tax variables: 
- Social contributions paid by retirees, as a percentage of the equivalent disposable 
income, 
- Social contributions paid by workers,  
- Income tax and housing tax paid by retirees, 
- Income tax and housing tax paid by workers, 
- Property tax paid by retirees, 
- Property tax paid by workers, 
- Solidarity tax on wealth (STW) paid by retirees,  
- STW paid by workers. 
 
Next, we introduce variables to control for the impact of socio-economic phenomena: 
 
- The mean age of the samples (retired and active), 
- The mean age at the end of the studies, 
- The mean number of household members by percentile, 
- The proportion of women in the percentiles, 
- The proportion of homeowners, 
- The proportion of foreign-born persons, 
- The proportion of executives, 
- The proportion of farmers, 
- The proportion of white collar workers, 
- The proportion of blue collar workers, 
- The proportion of employees. 
 
Given the presence of outliers in our data, the classical least squares estimator may be 
distorted. To correct for this bias, we propose different robust-to-outliers methods from the 
literature.  
First, we calculate the Cook distances to indicate data points that are particularly worth 
checking for validity. Data points with large outliers and/or high leverage may distort the 
outcome and accuracy of the OLS regression. Consequently, observations associated with a 
Cook distance larger than 1 receive a zero weight. We then employ a Tukey biweight loss 
function. 
 
Cook distances are able to identify isolated outliers, but they are inappropriate in cases with 
clusters of outliers. Rousseew and Van Zommeren (1990) show that one outlier can mask the 
presence of another. Full robustness can be achieved using the Salibian-Barrera and Yohaï 
(2006) estimator. It consists of randomly selecting N subsets with p observations (p-subsets), 
where p is the number of estimated parameters. Each p-subset is defined such that it does not 
contain outliers. The number of N subsets is generated to guarantee that at least one p-subset 
(2) 
ccc Xy εβ +=  
 
without outliers is selected with high probability (See Salibian-Barrera and Yohaï, 2006, and 
Verardi and Croux, 2009): 
 
     
 
 
 
 
where  α  is the expected proportion of outliers (equal to 0.2), p is the number of estimated 
parameters and Pclean is the desired probability of having at least one p-subset without 
outliers among N subsets. This probability is fixed at 0.99. 
 
We also propose a model with panel data from 2004 to 2007. Given the short temporal 
dimension, we prefer a random effects model. The Hausman test confirms that this 
specification is a better fit for our data (see table 5 in the appendix).  
 
Assuming that the entity’s error term is not correlated with the regressors, the empirical 
model is formulated as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
where the dependent variable, tcy , , represents the difference between the equivalent incomes 
of active people and retirees across percentiles. tcX ,  includes the explanatory variables. tc,ε  
follows a multivariate normal distribution with mean 0.  cτ  and tc,ρ  are dependant variables 
having standard normal distributions. 
 
4. Results 
 
The different specifications proposed indicate the impacts of the income tax, social 
contributions, property taxes and the housing tax on the inequality between workers and 
retirees (see tables 1 to 4 in the appendix). 
Using linear regressions, robustness analysis and panel regressions, we highlight the 
significant and positive impact of the social security contributions paid by the active 
population on the size of the inequality. Housing taxes paid by workers also have a significant 
and positive impact on the inequality between workers and retirees. In other words, the 
correlation between the impact of these taxes and our dependent variable is positive, 
indicating an increasing trend in the income gap between the working population and retirees.  
In contrast, we demonstrate the significant and negative impact of the social contributions 
paid by pensioners, their housing and income taxes. When these taxes increase, the gap 
between the disposable income of working people and retirees tends to decrease. 
 
These results show that a reduction in tax deductions specifically for retirees could reduce the 
gap in living standards between the active population and the retired population. While some 
(3) ( )( )[ ]  −−−= PcleanPN α11log 1log  
(4) 
 
(5) 
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tax relief involves targeted services (personal services) with social objectives, other types do 
not have an economic or social justification. For example, the 10% income tax deduction for 
retirees and the 10% deduction allocated to workers for business expenses have no economic 
justification, especially when the retired household has a high standard of living. When the 
income tax paid by retirees increases by one percentage point relative to disposable income, 
the gap in living standards between workers and pensioners seems to fall by approximately 
0.39 euro. 
 
Decreasing the housing tax paid by workers or reducing the income tax paid by working 
households would also reduce inequality. The results of the robust estimation using the 
Salibian-Barrera method (see table 3 in the appendix) show that a one percentage point 
increase in the property tax paid by active persons would imply an increase in the gap 
between the living standards of workers and retirees of 0.2 euro. 
We observe a significant and positive impact of the proportion of homeowners among the 
active population. The higher the proportion of homeowners among workers, the greater the 
income gap. Retirees are more frequently homeowners, and this allows them to relax their 
budget constraints. On the contrary, the mortgage or rent payments constitute a heavy burden 
for active households. If the average proportion of homeowners among workers increases by 
one percentage point, the income gap between workers and retirees increases by 9 euros, on 
average (see table 3 in the appendix). 
 
 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
 
Different tax rules are applied to members of the labour force and retired people. However, 
the degree of inequality between the two groups and the living standards of pensioners do not 
seem to justify the existence of unequal treatment (See Legendre, 2010). Our empirical 
analysis suggests that an increase in social contributions for pensioners and a reduction in 
some of their income tax advantages could reduce the income gap between the active and 
retired populations. 
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 Appendix 
 
Table 1 OLS model explaining inequalities 
  Coefficient 
Social contribution paid by workers 0.432 
Property tax paid by workers 0.959 
Housing tax paid by workers 0.066** 
Income tax paid by workers 0.03 
Solidarity tax on wealth (STW) paid by workers 0.049 
Social contribution paid by retirees -0.389* 
Property tax paid by retirees 1.108 
Housing tax paid by retirees 0.017 
Income tax paid by retirees -0.389* 
Solidarity tax on wealth (STW) paid by retirees 0.056 
Number of consumption units within households of workers  -126.61 
Mean of the workers by percentile -83.769 
Mean age of workers by percentile at the end of the studies 
-211.845 
Proportion of homeowners per percentile of workers 199.572 
Proportion of foreign workers by percentile -85.682 
Proportion of women among percentiles of workers  342.099 
Proportion of farmers within the percentiles of workers 4634.293* 
Proportion of executives within the percentiles of workers -2212.559 
Proportion of white collar workers within the percentiles of 
workers 
-4.316 
Proportion of employees within the percentiles of workers 3075.964** 
Proportion of blue collar workers within the percentiles of 
workers 
2270.289 
Number of consumption units within households of retirees -127.312 
Mean of the retirees by percentile 27.771 
Mean age of retirees by percentile at the end of the studies 
82.948 
Proportion of homeowner within per percentile of retirees -200.495 
Proportion of foreign retirees by percentile -3749.488 
Proportion of women among percentiles of retirees  -1357.144 
Proportion of farmers within the percentiles of retirees -1385.968 
Proportion of executives within the percentiles of retirees 2380.52 
 
Proportion of white collar workers within the percentiles of 
retirees 
-1156.945 
Proportion of employees within the percentiles of retirees 804.443 
Proportion of blue collar workers within the percentiles of 
retirees 
899.711 
Intercept 2979.751 
N 400 
R² 0.246 
F(32,367) 59.511 
Legend: * : 10%, ** : 5%, *** : 1% 
 
Table 2 Robust estimation, Tukey biweight 
 Coefficient 
Social contribution paid by workers 0.09 
Property tax paid by workers 0.018 
Housing tax paid by workers 0.053* 
Income tax paid by workers 0.016 
Solidarity tax on wealth (STW) paid by workers 0.014 
Social contribution paid by the retirees -0.02 
Property tax paid by the retirees 0.582* 
Housing tax paid by the retirees -1.542** 
Income tax paid by the retirees -0.03 
Solidarity tax on wealth (STW) paid by the retirees 0.022 
Number of consumption units within households by worker 
percentile 
-16.989 
Mean average of the workers by percentile -29.593* 
Mean age of workers by percentile at the end of the studies 
-13.353 
Proportion of homeowner within per percentile of workers 1437.369*** 
Proportion of foreign workers by percentile 
 
-1879.87***  
Proportion of women among percentiles of workers  -285.7 
Proportion of farmers within the percentiles of workers 134.88 
Proportion of executives within the percentiles of workers -2085.71*** 
Proportion of white collar workers within the percentiles of 
workers 
887.31 
Proportion of employees within the percentiles of workers 1400.054 
Proportion of blue collar workers within the percentiles of 
workers 
616.72 
Number of consumption unities within households of retirees 
percentiles 
57.37 
Mean of the retirees by percentile -22.658 
 
Mean age of retirees by percentile at the end of the studies 
-15.175 
Proportion of homeowners within the percentiles of retirees -303.759 
Proportion of foreign retirees by percentile 243.69 
Proportion of women among percentiles of retirees  -276.628 
Proportion of farmers within the percentiles of retirees -1407.41*** 
Proportion of executives within the percentiles of retirees -1983.31*** 
Proportion of white collar workers within the percentiles of 
retirees 
-436.278 
Proportion of employees within the percentiles of retirees 482.848 
Proportion of blue collar workers within the percentiles of 
retirees 
681.148 
Intercept 3658.153* 
N 396 
R² 0.851 
F(32,367) 64.78 
Legend: * : 10%, ** : 5%, *** : 1% 
 
Table 3 Robust regression: Salibian and Barrera 
 Coefficient 
Social contribution paid by workers 0.196*** 
Property tax paid by workers -0.506 
Housing tax paid by workers 0.055*** 
Income tax paid by workers 0.13*** 
Solidarity tax on wealth (STW) paid by workers 0.113 
Social contribution paid by retirees -0.186*** 
Property tax paid by retirees 0.276 
Housing tax paid by retirees -1.088* 
Income tax paid by retirees -0.159*** 
Solidarity tax on wealth (STW) paid by retirees 0.027 
Number of consumption units within households by worker 
percentile 
10.081 
Mean age of the workers by percentile -2.684 
Mean age of workers by percentile at the end of the studies 
14.152 
Proportion of homeowners within the percentiles of workers 901.407*** 
Proportion of foreign workers by percentile -1754.446 
Proportion of women among percentiles of workers  19.069 
Proportion of farmers within the percentiles of workers -796.103 
 
Proportion of executives within the percentiles of workers -2339.7*** 
Proportion of white collar workers within the percentiles of 
workers 
574.822 
Proportion of employees within the percentiles of workers 1212.276 
Proportion of blue collar workers within the percentiles of 
workers 
1132.483 
Number of consumption units within households of retirees by 
percentiles 
57.456 
Mean age of the retirees by percentile -16.91 
Mean age of retirees by percentile at the end of the studies 
-47.439 
Proportion of homeowners within per percentile of retirees -272.979 
Proportion of foreign retirees by percentile 220.488 
Proportion of women among percentiles of retirees  -588.5* 
Proportion of farmers within the percentiles of retirees -1346.7*** 
Proportion of executives within the percentiles of retirees -2031.8*** 
Proportion of white collar workers within the percentiles of 
retirees 
-97.263 
Proportion of employees within the percentiles of retirees 491.064 
Proportion of blue collar workers within the percentiles of 
retirees 
163.218 
Intercept 2152.824 
N 400 
Legend: * : 10%, ** : 5%, *** : 1% 
 
 
 
Table 4 Model with panel data 
 Coefficient 
Social contribution paid by workers 0.432*** 
Property tax paid by workers 0.959 
Housing tax paid by workers 0.066 
Income tax paid by workers 0.003 
Solidarity tax on wealth (STW) paid by workers 0.049 
Social contribution paid by the retirees -0.389*** 
Property tax paid by the retirees 1.108 
Housing tax paid by the retirees 0.017 
Income tax paid by the retirees -0.389*** 
Solidarity tax on wealth (STW) paid by the retirees 0.056 
Number of consumption unities within households of workers 
percentile 
-126.616 
 
Mean age of the workers by percentile -83.769 
Mean age of workers by percentile at the end of the studies 
-211.845 
Proportion of homeowner within per percentile of workers 199.572 
Proportion of foreign workers by percentile -85.682 
Proportion of women among percentiles of workers  342.099 
Proportion of farmers within the percentiles of workers 4634.293 
Proportion of executives within the percentiles of workers -2212.559 
Proportion of white collar workers within the percentiles of 
workers 
-4.316 
Proportion of employees within the percentiles of workers 3075.96* 
Proportion of blue collar workers within the percentiles of 
workers 
2270.289 
Number of consumption units within households of retirees 
percentiles 
-127.312 
Mean age of the retirees by percentile 27.771 
Mean age of retirees by percentile at the end of the studies 
82.948 
Proportion of homeowner within per percentile of retirees -200.485 
Proportion of foreign retirees by percentile -3749.488 
Proportion of women among percentiles of retirees  -1357.144 
Proportion of farmers within the percentiles of retirees -1385.968 
Proportion of executives within the percentiles of retirees 2380.591 
Proportion of white collar workers within the percentiles of 
retirees 
-1156.945 
Proportion of employees within the percentiles of retirees 804.443 
Proportion of blue collar workers within the percentiles of 
retirees 
899.711 
Intercept 2979.751 
N 400 
Chi2(32) 119.782 
Legend: * : 10%, ** : 5%, *** : 1% 
 
Table 5 Tests 
Hausman 
test 
Chi2(32)=13.36 
Prob>Chi2=0.94 
 Breusch 
Pagan 
test 
Chi2(1)=36.12 
Prob>Chi2=0.00 
 
 
